A public inquiry into the catastrophic 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London on Wednesday attributed the disaster to failures by the government, the construction industry, and primarily, the companies responsible for installing flammable cladding on the building's exterior. The blaze, which engulfed the 23-story social housing block in one of west London's wealthiest areas in the early hours of June 14, 2017, claimed 72 lives. It marked Britain's deadliest fire in a residential building since World War Two.
"The simple truth is that the deaths that occurred were all avoidable," stated inquiry chair Martin Moore-Bick. The inquiry's final report, which was highly anticipated, placed most of the blame for the disaster on the companies involved in the maintenance and renovation of the tower, as well as on local and national authorities and companies that had falsely marketed combustible cladding materials as safe. There was also widespread criticism directed at the then-government, the local authority of Kensington and Chelsea, the industry, regulatory bodies, specific individuals, and a poorly prepared fire brigade for years of inaction regarding fire safety in high-rise buildings.
"Not all of them bear the same degree of responsibility for the eventual disaster, but as our reports show, all contributed to it in one way or another, in most cases, through incompetence, but in some cases, through dishonesty and greed," Moore-Bick added. The inquiry report, which spanned nearly 1,700 pages, concluded that the blaze was the result of "decades of failure." Since the fire, survivors and relatives of the victims have demanded that those responsible face criminal charges.
"The duty of government should be to safeguard life, whilst protecting us from corporate greed," said Grenfell United, a group representing some survivors and bereaved families. "But for too long, they have aided corporations, facilitating them to profit and dictate regulation." Although the British police have stated that 58 people and 19 firms and organizations are under investigation, prosecutions—including for corporate manslaughter and fraud—remain years away due to the complexity and the need to consider the inquiry's report.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer said the government would carefully consider the inquiry's findings to ensure there was no repeat of the disaster. An earlier report by the inquiry team in 2019, which focused on the events of the night, found that an electrical fault in a refrigerator on the fourth floor started the fire. Flames spread uncontrollably, mainly because the tower had been covered during a 2016 refurbishment with cladding—exterior panels designed to improve appearance and add insulation—made of flammable aluminium composite material that acted as a source of fuel.
The harrowing accounts, including from those who perished while awaiting rescue and having followed official guidance to stay put, sparked outrage and national soul-searching over building standards and the treatment of low-income communities. The inquiry, headed by retired judge Martin Moore-Bick, found a litany of failings; lessons had not been learned from past high-rise tower blazes and testing systems were inadequate. The most overt blame was laid at the feet of those involved in the refurbishment of the tower with the flammable cladding. The inquiry said architect Studio E, principal contractor Rydon, and cladding sub-contractor Harley all bore considerable responsibility for the disaster.
Fire safety inspectors Exova were also blamed for the building being left "in a dangerous condition on completion of the refurbishment." Both Kensington and Chelsea council and the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), which managed the local authority's housing stock, were also heavily criticized. They had shown indifference to fire safety regulations in the years before the blaze and the TMO, whose difficult relationship with some residents was said to have created a "toxic atmosphere," had been unduly focused on cutting costs.
While the local community and voluntary groups were praised for providing support, the council was also criticized for its slow, muddled, and "wholly inadequate" response to the incident. There was also condemnation of those firms which made and sold the cladding or its foam insulation—Celotex, Kingspan, and Arconic Architectural Products, the French subsidiary of US company Arconic. The inquiry concluded there had been "systematic dishonesty" on their part. "They engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent tested data and mislead the market," the report said.
Arconic said it rejected any claim it had sold an unsafe product or tried to conceal information about tests of its materials. Kingspan said it had "long acknowledged the wholly unacceptable historical failings" but said these were not causative of the tragedy. The issue of exterior cladding has raised concerns across Europe where there have been similar blazes in apartment blocks such as in the Spanish city of Valencia in February, and in Italy in 2021. In Britain, government figures from July showed 3,280 buildings standing at 11 metres or higher still had unsafe cladding, with remediation work yet to start on more than two-thirds of them.
